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Abstract
Research Summary:We consider what configurations of his-
torical and geographic dimensions influence entrepreneurial
growth aspirations (EGA). Our theoretical framework com-
bines geography (coastal location, resource dependence),
long-term colonial history (ethnic heterogeneity, legal origins),
and postcolonial history (low levels of conflict and population
displacement; not having “bad neighbors”). We employ
abductive reasoning to link the social science and historical
literatures via analytically structured histories of Ghana, Nige-
ria, and Angola. Next, we undertake a fuzzy set qualitative
comparative analysis on sub-Saharan Africa countries to
investigate which particular configurations of these dimen-
sions are important for EGA. We demonstrate the importance
of configurations over individual variables and add context-
bound dimensions to the study of entrepreneurship in devel-
oping countries, through historical analysis.
Managerial Summary: Our analysis may offer entrepreneurs
a template for identifying potential opportunities and threats
in order to calibrate their strategies for scaling up their ven-
ture in sub-Saharan Africa. We argue that environments rich
in entrepreneurial growth opportunities are associated with
configurations where negative aspects are more than
Received: 15 June 2018 Revised: 5 December 2019 Accepted: 29 December 2019
DOI: 10.1002/sej.1348
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License, which permits use,
distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited and is not used for commercial purposes.
© 2020 The Authors. Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Strategic Management
Society.
Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal. 2020;1–23. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/sej 1
compensated by positive ones. For Botswana, the low levels
of internal conflict compensate for unfavorable location. For
Angola, the positive impact of coastal location and relatively
low ethnic heterogeneity counterbalance the negative effect
of resource rents. Resource-driven economies are more
entrepreneurial: better economic opportunities can some-
times result from having extractive industries. For African
entrepreneurs it is not only relevant what happens in their
own countries, as their opportunities are directly affected by
economic or political turmoil in neighboring countries.
K E YWORD S
Africa, entrepreneurship, global entrepreneurship monitor, history,
qualitative comparative analysis
1 | INTRODUCTION
Institutional environments affect the motivation of individuals to engage in entrepreneurship (Baumol, 1990), and,
importantly, their entrepreneurial growth aspirations (EGA; Autio & Acs, 2010; Bowen & DeClercq, 2008; Estrin,
Korosteleva, & Mickiewicz, 2013; Levie & Autio, 2011). However, these environments have complex historical roots,
and in this article, we advance the understanding of this relationship by looking at the separate roles of both longer-
and shorter-term historical factors.
North's work on institutions and development (1990, 2006) already notes the potential significance of history
for understanding the characteristics of economic activity including entrepreneurship. However, this relationship
needs to be refined because history is interpreted as stretching back centuries but not all institutions have such deep
roots. Moreover, history is not destiny (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2008); and institutional contexts can
change dramatically both in the long run and in the short to medium term (Braudel, 1995; North, 2006). Furthermore,
North based his analysis on an interpretation of how institutions had evolved in Western Europe, though much
entrepreneurial activity takes place in parts of the world, mainly developing economies, which are currently only
poorly reflected in history-conscious entrepreneurial theory.1 Hence, we contribute context-bound insight to entre-
preneurial theory (Tsui, 2004; Welter & Gartner, 2016) that more commonly researched contexts such as North
America and Europe would not allow us to recognize. Moreover, the focus on historical legacies in the institutional
environment also engages with calls to consider historical reasoning and research as source for new theorizing
(Gartner, Jones, Kirsch, Wadhwani, & Welter, forthcoming; Wadhwani, 2010, 2016a; Wadhwani & Lubinski, 2017).
In order to focus on the type of entrepreneurial activity, which significantly impacts economic development and
growth, our analysis of the relationship between history, institutions and entrepreneurship is based on the finely
grained notion of high-growth aspiration entrepreneurship (HGAE). Necessity entrepreneurship and self-
employment are often conflated with low-growth aspiration entrepreneurship and are the predominant forms of
entrepreneurial activity in developing countries. They may generate some income and employment for the entrepre-
neurs and their close friends and family, yet their impact on economic growth is very limited (Acs, Desai, & Klapper,
2008; Estrin, Mickiewicz, Stephan, & Wright, 2018; Henrekson and Stenkula, 2016). This contrasts with HGAE, in
which the entrepreneur's objective is to accumulate the resources and the competitive advantages required to
appropriate the full value from identified opportunities (Bjørnskov & Foss, 2013; Hitt, Ireland, Camp, & Sexton,
2001; Hitt, Ireland, Sirmon, & Trahms, 2011; Ireland, Hitt, & Sirmon, 2003; Kuratko & Audretsch, 2009). HGAE can
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therefore have profound effects on economic development (Acs, Estrin, Mickiewicz, & Szerb, 2018; Baumol & Strom,
2007), but is also highly sensitive to the institutional environment (Autio & Acs, 2010; Estrin et al., 2013). We pro-
pose that the institutional conditions conducive to HGAE rather than to subsistence or necessity entrepreneurship
have their roots in complex configurations of historical factors.
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is an important region to analyze in this respect; it represents one of the new frontiers
of business research (George, Corbishley, Khayesi, Haas, & Tihanyi, 2016), the third largest populated area after
China and India, with a population close to 1 billion people (across 46 different states), which is expected to rise to
2.7 billion by 2060 (World Bank, 2015). Moreover, SSA has the youngest population in the world, with a population
pyramid conducive to economic growth.2 Despite this potential, the region has long faced fundamental challenges in
its development process associated with geographical constraints as well as historical legacies (Collier, 2008;
Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2018). Research on entrepreneurship in Africa is relatively fragmented (Acs, Szerb, &
Jackson, 2013; Kiggundu, 2002; Kuada, 2015; Naudé & Havenga, 2005), and rarely addresses the historical legacies
of the institutional environment. Furthermore, the similarities across countries in terms of their long-term institu-
tional context, such as their common exposure to colonialism, may not alone explain the EGA. Our framing underlies
the distinction between long-term and medium to short-term history: the former notably concerning the colonial
heritage and the latter postcolonial events. Thus, we argue that EGA are largely shaped by configurations of three
factors: long-term historical factors, short-term history, and geographic location.
We consider two research questions. First, what configurations of historical and geographic dimensions influ-
ence HGAE outcomes in SSA? To address this question, we employ abductive reasoning to link the social science
and historical literatures. We use analytically structured histories of three African countries (Ghana, Nigeria, and
Angola), based on a close reading of the secondary literature in the social sciences and history, to develop a concep-
tual framework identifying the key dimensions potentially affecting EGA. We go on to utilize the dimensions identi-
fied in that framework to undertake a fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA; Douglas, Shepherd, &
Prentice, 2020) in order to address our second research question: which configurations of these dimensions are
important for HGAE? Our fsQCA analysis suggests that elements of long-term colonial history (i.e., British vs. other
colonies; ethnic heterogeneity); of postcolonial history (i.e., high/low levels of conflict and population displacement;
not having “bad neighbors”); as well as of geography (i.e., coastal locations, resource endowments) together play an
important role in the configurations of historical and geographic factors supportive of HGAE. The results emphasize
the need for a contextually sensitive and history-conscious analysis which focuses on configurations of dimensions
rather than on separate independent variables.
In the following section, we present the preliminary framework to understand the relationship between long-
and short-term historical factors, geographic dimensions, and EGA, drawing on analytically structured case histories.
We go on in the third section to use this framework to structure our fsQCA. Our discussion of the results leads to
conclusions highlighting the wider lessons about the historical origins of HGAE, and the implications for entrepre-
neurship theory.
2 | THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HISTORICAL METHODS
Baumol (1990) utilizes historical analysis to posit that institutions affect the choice between productive and
unproductive forms of entrepreneurship (see also Sobel, 2008). This argument has been extended to HGAE by Autio
and Acs (2010) and Estrin et al. (2013): they suggest that inadequate institutions reduce the incentives for entrepre-
neurs to create high-growth aspiration ventures. Thus, the institutional environment affects the “quality” of entre-
preneurship through the aspirations of owners–managers of the new ventures, and in that way influences their
impact on employment, growth, and economic development (Estrin et al., 2018). However, understanding the institu-
tional environment is not a trivial task, and this is especially true for developing countries in general, and for Africa in
particular (Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2018; Nunn & Wantchekon, 2011). In part, this is because understanding
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institutions entails knowledge of the history of the country in which those institutions evolve (Acemoglu & Robinson,
2012; North, 1990, 2006). Hence, we can only fully understand institutional determinants if we engage in context-
bound (Tsui, 2004) and history-conscious theorizing (Gartner et al., forthcoming), to enrich entrepreneurship theory.
To develop our theoretical framework, we proceed to identify potentially important elements of the institutional
environment through abduction. Abductive reasoning is key to historical analysis (Megill, 2007; Wadhwani & Decker,
2017) and is well aligned with “the inherent characteristics of QCA” (Park, Fiss, & el Sawy, n.d., p. 13). Mantere and
Ketokivi (2013, p. 72) highlight the importance of abduction for theorization, stressing the importance of transpar-
ency in the selection between alternatives. We employ abductive reasoning here to link two different literatures: the
social science literature, comprised of development studies and entrepreneurship studies in SSA, and the historical
literature, comprised of economic and political histories, as well as country-based accounts and continent-wide syn-
theses. Finally, we match the emerging dimensions with the available data for SSA, as we aim to develop the theoret-
ical framework further utilizing the fsQCA. In order to be transparent about the abductive process that underpins
our articulation of the framework, we confirm, discard, or refine our understanding of the chosen dimensions. Emerg-
ing categories that are confirmed become dimensions of the theoretical framework that informs the fsQCA. Con-
versely, those discarded are listed but not further discussed due to space constraints. All dimensions have been
refined through analytically structured histories, which are discussed in greater detail in the following subsections.
2.1 | Selecting the dimensions of the theoretical framework
The development literature has identified several factors that explain the inability of some African countries to sus-
tain economic growth, summarized by Collier (2008) as development “traps.” Collier singles out four traps—being
landlocked, resource-dependent, and having bad neighbors and high ethnic heterogeneity—and stresses their
interdependence. Thus, development traps can work together as configurations, as well as impacting individually. For
example, being landlocked may have serious negative impact only if this effect is amplified by the same country hav-
ing bad neighbors. Being ethnically heterogeneous not only makes civil war or internal conflicts more likely, but also
makes them more prolonged (Collier, 2008).
These contextual factors can also be important for EGA. For example, being landlocked implies a more difficult
access to international markets (Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2018; Sowell, 2015), and therefore reduces the
potential for exporting and engaging in global value chains, both of which may limit EGA. Alongside that, being natu-
ral resource-dependent (especially on a single mineral resource), may lead to concentrated rents, supporting oligar-
chic structures that limit the range of entrepreneurial opportunities for large sections of the society, again lowering
HGAE (Mehlum, Moene, & Torvik, 2006). In contrast, where ethnic heterogeneity is lower, natural resources may
play a more positive role in development.
We draw on these explanations from the social science and development literatures as a priori categories to
structure our reading of secondary historical accounts. We first relate the social science explanations to detailed,
mostly country-based, histories. SSA is a region of 46 countries with diverse colonial and postcolonial trajectories;
however, we focus only on those countries represented in the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) database.
When we rank order them by EGA from the highest, the list starts with Botswana, Nigeria, Senegal, Angola, Ghana,
Burkina Faso, and Cameroon. Among those with high-level entrepreneurial aspirations, Botswana and Senegal are in
our view both well described in the economic development literature (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Boone, 2006).
The other three countries with relatively high EGA—Nigeria, Angola, and Ghana—are more complex if not puzzling.
Mapping them onto the development traps we introduced earlier, they provide us with some similarities: in particu-
lar, none of them is landlocked. Because many SSA countries were formed on the basis of the requirements of colo-
nial administration rather than their ethnic or national identities, the ethnic characteristics of the population
represents a second important contextual factor (Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2018). If a country is ethnically het-
erogeneous, this can create fragmentation of internal markets, including the labor market, and may also lead to
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discrimination by the dominant ethnic group (Khoury & Prasad, 2016; Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2018). In both
cases, limits to entrepreneurial opportunities emerge, lowering EGA (Estrin et al., 2013). We notice that for all the
three countries, the level of ethnic heterogeneity is below the median of our sample.
Yet, there are also significant differences:
• Nigeria and Ghana were part of the British empire, while Angola was part of the Portuguese empire.
• Angola has some bad neighbors, Nigeria and Ghana less so.
• While all three countries are resource-dependent, Angola has been so to a greater extent.3
Through this process, we have therefore confirmed and importantly refined the four development traps listed earlier.
Historical analysis also challenged whether these dimensions should be considered in isolation from others: for
example, constraints in colonial and postcolonial institutional environments have been circumvented or offset by
geography (openness to trade through access to the sea). This reflexive comparison between the two literatures and
available data also led us to discard other initial categories, such as corruption and quality of governance. Thus, Nige-
ria and Angola show very high rates of EGA despite having high rates of corruption according to Transparency Inter-
national's widely used index.4 The historical narratives in conjunction with specific studies in African
entrepreneurship further confirmed the importance of migration, and the distinction between voluntary and forced
migration, which fed back into our theoretical framing. A recent history of internal conflicts, civil wars, and mass ter-
ror inflicted by some oppressive regimes act to suppress inclusive access to entrepreneurial opportunities and deeply
affect motivation, thereby dampening growth aspirations. Furthermore, it is important to consider not only develop-
ments in a country, but those in neighboring countries as well. Having “bad” neighbors implies that trade opportuni-
ties are not realized (Collier, 2008) and is likely to cause disruption resulting from inflows of refugees and spillover of
conflicts (Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2018).
Finally, the institutional past of countries in SSA was clearly shaped by the identity of the relevant colonial
power, but this has been conceptualized differently in the social science and the historical literature. We draw on the
key distinction developed in the institutional literature between the common law (English) and civic law (continental
Europe) traditions; these differences have a long-term institutional effect, shaping, among other entrepreneurial
activity (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Hough & Grier, 2015; La Porta et al., 2008). However, this distinction was
refined by historical accounts that see legal origins as part of a broader administrative heritage. Table 1 illustrates the
relationship of concepts from the different literatures and our final dimensions in a stylized fashion.
2.2 | Refining the theoretical dimensions through analytically structured histories
We present our analytically structured history of these three country cases in support of our contention that HGAE
in SSA is the result of complex, equifinal, and evolving combinations of factors. This type of history is neither
TABLE 1 Development of dimensions for theoretical framework
Social science literature fsQCA dimensions Historical literature
The role of geography Landlocked Colonial border-shaping
Resource endowment Resource-dependent Resource curse
Legal origins Legal origins Colonial legacy; direct versus indirect rule
Ethnic fractionalization Ethnic heterogeneity Colonial sharpening of ethnic cleavages
Bad neighbors Bad neighbors Postcolonial conflict
Disruptive conflict Disruptive conflict: refugees Forced migration
Abbreviation: fsQCA, fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis.
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anecdotal nor a straightforward description of events, but rather an approach to develop concepts and map out their
interactions (Rowlinson, Hassard, & Decker, 2014). In historical organization studies, narrating is employed to explain
the origins of contemporary phenomena and helps to make connections between different factors and to discern
patterns (Maclean, Harvey, Clegg, 2016). The aim of our analytically structured history is to provide a context-
sensitive synthesis of possible explanations for our three example countries—Nigeria, Angola, and Ghana—that helps
to design the fsQCA and to interpret its results. It is analytically structured in that it explores the different dimen-
sions outlined previously, rather than narrating each country's history separately.
We grouped the dimensions under geography (landlocked, resource-dependent), long-term colonial history (legal
origins, ethnic heterogeneity), and short-term postcolonial history (refugees from, bad neighbors). Geography focuses
on resource endowments and access to sea. Colonial history reflects legacies such as administrative heritage of com-
mon or civil law systems, with implications for the way in which different ethnic populations were governed within a
colony. Finally, postcolonial history deals with instability and insecurity that African states experienced either inter-
nally or externally (see Figure 1). We discuss these dimensions in detail below.
2.2.1 | Geography
We consider the effects of geography separately from colonial and postcolonial history, but always as closely related
to historical developments. This is because the contemporary shape and character of African countries was in part
the consequence of colonial expansion in the nineteenth century, which ultimately led to the creation of present-day
states during decolonization (Cardoso Reis, 2015; Cooper, 2002; Darwin, 1999; Holland, 1985).
Both Nigeria and Angola have been well-known major oil exporters in Africa, and the sector played an important
role in their economies (Andreasson, 2015; Birmingham, 2006; Clarence-Smith, 1985; Nugent, 2002). Ghana has dis-
covered offshore oil and gas deposits recently, and only started exploitation in 2010 (Hickey, Abdulai, Izama, &
Mohan, 2015). We focus on resource dependence, particularly in terms of oil and gas, because this has been known to
exert an influence on the occupational choice of individuals, especially in developing countries. Attitudes toward
HGAE may depend on peoples' perceptions of how successful and prominent individuals attained their current posi-
tion and status. Governments in developing economies are often expected to create secure jobs, and government
sectors of countries without oil revenues are on average half as large as of those with them (Ross, 2012;
Wenar, 2016).
F IGURE 1 Institutional factors influencing entrepreneurial growth aspirations
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Nevertheless, there are significant differences between the three countries. Nigeria has the second highest level
of EGA in our sample, as illustrated by Figure 2 below. The GEM data are consistent with a survey conducted for
Forbes Insight: 86% of Nigerian respondents were interested in starting their own business, above the 80% average
for SSA (Forbes Insights, 2015). Their report further highlights that, while Nigerians were not uncritical of entrepre-
neurs, 63% admire their courage and resilience, and only 13% believed that they made their profits dishonestly.
Moreover, 40% of Nigerians counted on entrepreneurs and small and medium enterprises to create the most jobs
for young people in the next 5 years.
Angola also scores relatively well in terms of EGA, like Ghana, yet lower than Nigeria. These differences are
more marked with respect to general entrepreneurial attitudes; in the Forbes Insight survey (, 2015), only 51% of
Angolan respondents were interested in starting their own business, while 54% of Angolan respondents counted on
the government/public sector to create jobs. Angolans also viewed entrepreneurs more critically than Nigerians, with
41% assuming they used their connections to build a business, and 29% believing that they did not make their profits
honestly. Nevertheless, Angola shows strong EGA, even if these are not at the same high level as in Nigeria.
While we would expect resource rents to work against HGAE, this may be counterbalanced by the fact that all
three countries have access to the sea. We noted earlier that not being landlocked has significant benefits, such as
openness and trade opportunities, all conducive to HGAE.
2.2.2 | Colonial history
Many African countries were shaped in the 19th century by a process of colonial occupation. Thus, preexisting politi-
cal entities were subsumed within different colonial systems with implications for institutional frameworks, language,
and administrative heritage. As a result, African countries often have a colonial legacy of ethnic heterogeneity. How-
ever, there are significant differences in how this has become reflected in current political structures. Among our
F IGURE 2 (High-growth
aspiration entrepreneurship/
Working age population)
rates among the sub-Saharan
African countries,
2001–2017. Box diagrams,
where the borders of the box
represent the first and the
third quartile of the
distribution, median (the
second quartile) is
represented by a vertical line,
whiskers from the boxes are
stretched to adjacent values
(correspondingly: the lowest
and the highest within the
range defined with reference
to quartiles and interquartile
range), and outliers are
represented by dots. Source:
Authors' calculations based
on Global Entrepreneurship
Monitor data. Please also see
methodological discussion in
Section 3.1
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three examples, ethnic heterogeneity is relatively lower in Angola. This may have been an important factor in over-
coming the heritage of conflict and of relatively authoritarian governance historically. This relatively lower level of
diversity is important for HGAE because it extends the internal markets for goods, services, and labor and excludes
fewer groups of people from entrepreneurial activity (Khoury & Prasad, 2016). The level of conflict in Angola has
recently remained low and the resulting stability has likely had a positive effect on EGA.
Ghana is an example of how the potentially negative impact of ethnic heterogeneity has been contained within
the political system. At present, the country is considered to be democratic, but has been termed “clientelist,” refer-
ring to a political process in which certain groups (local, regional, ethnic, occupational, etc.) demand material goods in
return for electoral support.5 Critically however, with two major parties competing at the elections—the NPP being
broadly pro-market and the NDC more populist and statist (Hickey et al., 2015)—this process of gaining and reward-
ing support is not ethnically based. This contrasts with Nigeria, where the federal decentralized system bestowed by
British reinforced existing ethnic and religious divisions, and has formed the basis of the main political parties
(Diamond, 1988). What followed was political competition between the Muslim North and the largely Christian and
Animist South, with these regional tensions leading to the secession of Biafra in 1967 and the Nigerian civil war
(Klieman, 2012; Nugent, 2002; Uche, 2008). Thus, ethnic heterogeneity does not always transform into dysfunc-
tional politics, helping us to refine our understanding of ethnic heterogeneity in terms of how it interacts with the
political system with implications for HGAE.
Other elements of colonial history may favor HGAE in Ghana and Nigeria over Angola. The key difference
between Nigeria and Ghana on the one hand, and Angola on the other, is the different nature of the colonial
regime. We summarize this through the distinction between common and civil law countries, and the differential
economic outcomes attributed to each. First, the literature argues that British (common law tradition) versus Portu-
guese (civil law tradition) colonialism embedded different political and economic institutions, with the former more
friendly to entrepreneurial activities than the latter (La Porta et al., 2008). Second, it has been documented for
Africa that in former British colonies the level of educational attainment is higher (Michalopoulos & Papaioannou,
2018),6 and the latter has been generally identified as a strong factor enhancing EGA (Estrin et al., 2013). Thus, we
could argue that both in the case of Nigeria and more recently in Ghana, the impact of oil resources was
counterbalanced by the tradition of an indigenous thriving business culture which British colonial rule had not
entirely suppressed (Deutsch, 1995; Fieldhouse, 1986; Forrest, 1994; Hopkins, 1965; Nwabughuogu, 1982). Both
countries also benefitted from access to the sea, which contributed to entrepreneurial activities through the easier
access to international trade.
Angola illustrates different dynamics. Commencing with the impact of the colonial system, the legacy of Portu-
guese colonialism is often considered to be more extractive than British or French colonial institutions; Portugal's
management of its colonies was bureaucratic, highly protectionist and provided little investment in industry or edu-
cation. It instead relied extensively on forced labor (corvee) and repression (especially during the Salazar dictatorship)
and this helped to create a sharp distinction between cities (where Portuguese settlers and Creole elites lived) and
the countryside (Clarence-Smith, 1979; Hodges, 2004). The private sector remained underdeveloped in Angola under
Portuguese rule and was largely reserved for Portuguese settlers.
Despite this legacy, Angola scores high for EGA, even if lower than Nigeria. This points to the importance of
looking at the configurations of dimensions. Factors that may be counterbalancing the impact of the nature of colo-
nial rule include the relatively lower ethnic heterogeneity and the country's geographic location. We already noted
the importance of access to sea, and Angola's capital, Luanda, always remained a significant trade center, which, here
as elsewhere, provided strong opportunities for HGAE. When Angolan politics became overshadowed by a business-
hostile ideology and conflict, entrepreneurship went below the radar screen and was channeled into the shadow
economy. In this respect, the heritage of rather inefficient Portuguese colonial administration made the dysfunctional
policies less effective. This indicates that the impact of legal origins may be through an administrative legacy, thus
refining our understanding of this dimension.
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2.2.3 | Postcolonial history
The differences in EGA between the countries may also be explained by variations in individuals' perceptions of the
potential gains from entrepreneurship. The character of a new venture is influenced by economic opportunities
related to entrepreneurship, and these result from recent historical developments that shape both attitudes and
available resources. Hence our final set of dimensions relate to postcolonial history.
All three countries have experienced a great deal of economic and political upheaval since independence, but to
varying degrees. Ghana has had a turbulent postindependence history and suffered periods of economic collapse
and military dictatorship. However, it experienced less political violence than Nigeria or Angola; while in turn
Nigeria's civil war was significantly shorter than Angola's and that country's transition to democracy also has been
longer and more sustained.
Thus, Nigeria had an early postindependence history of internal conflict in the 1960s, but it has since enjoyed
relative stability, albeit interspersed with periods of repressive and autocratic regimes. Despite the history of civil
war, and the ongoing conflict with Islamists in the North, some political solutions were achieved by widening partici-
pation in the sharing of rents from oil, especially when the militias in the Niger Delta accepted stabilization in return
for a $400 million per year amnesty programme (Wenar, 2016).
After the colonial war (1961–1975), Angolan independence was overshadowed by conflict between rival move-
ments, each backed by different Cold War powers: MPLA by USSR and Cuba, and UNITA by the USA (Birmingham,
2002; Hodges, 2004). The country was subject to a series of external and civil wars, with over three million civilians
displaced (Wenar, 2016). The capital city, Luanda, was dominated by the Marxist MPLA and political concepts
borrowed from the USSR reinforced authoritarian and bureaucratic traits inherited from the Portuguese (Hodges,
2004). During the 1990s, these fault lines erupted again (without much ideological allegiance) in two civil wars,
driven by the MPLA's access to crude petroleum and UNITA's control of most of diamond mining.
Angola emerged relatively late into independence (1975) and immediately suffered from the abrupt departure of
about 300,000 Portuguese administrators and other professionals, significantly disrupting the previous colonial insti-
tutional framework. They were largely replaced by indigenous Portuguese-speaking Angolans, who subscribed to the
same tradition of bureaucratic authoritarianism inherited from colonial times. Parallel to this, offshore petroleum
resources were discovered during the oil boom of the 1970s (Chabal, 2002). The state-owned oil company provided
significant resources to state employees during the wars of the 1980s and 1990s. As inflation eroded government
salaries, access to subsidized housing and products that could be traded on parallel markets continued to ensure
state employees had higher standards of living than other urban residents. The extensive Angolan state administra-
tion built on these oil revenues has been described as a hierarchical structure of patronage and privilege, which pro-
vided a political basis for the authoritarian regime (Shaxson, 2007; Wenar, 2016). Domestic entrepreneurs did
emerge during this time period, but they often depended on people with stable (government or oil company) salaries
for their businesses (Birmingham, 2002; Cain, 2004; Chabal, 2002).
For Ghana and Nigeria, the experience of decolonization was not just very different, but also completed earlier;
by 1957 and 1960, respectively. With the departure of British colonial civil servants, educated Nigerians and
Ghanaians benefitted from increased opportunities for appointment and promotion in the civil service and in multi-
nationals from the mid-1950s until the 1970s, as the handover from expatriates was gradual (Decker, 2010). By the
1970s, the Nigerianization decrees and the Ghanaian Business Promotion Act forced foreign investors to sell their
businesses to nationals (Biersteker, 1987; Collins, 1974, 1977; Esseks, 1975; Genova, 2010; Rood, 1976; Uche,
2013). This opened opportunities for entrepreneurs with high-growth aspirations. In more recent years, technology-
based clusters have been emerging in West Africa, and with them expectations of enabling these economies to leap-
frog stages of economic development (Economist, November 10, 2017). These new sectors, such as information and
mobile technology, are perceived as more meritocratic and offering opportunities in an equal and democratic fashion
to people based on their skills rather than their connections or via political patronage. This may create a virtuous cir-
cle of dynamic entrepreneurship and social support for it (see Arora & Gambardella, 2006, on India). By witnessing
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others achieving successful entrepreneurial careers, HGAE is fuelled in both Nigeria and Ghana (Amankwah-Amoah,
2018; McDade & Spring, 2005; The Economist, 2012).
However, the postcolonial history of a country's neighbors is also important for HGAE. Negative effects of con-
flicts in the neighboring countries can include trade disruption (which has particularly harsh effects for countries that
are landlocked), and massive waves of refugees. Ghana, for example, has recently encountered difficulties because of
the conflict in neighboring Côte d'Ivoire, but for most of its postcolonial history has remained relatively unaffected
by external conflicts. Nevertheless, during deep economic and political crisis in the early 1980s, Nigeria chose to
expel a large number of its Ghanaian residents, whose return significantly exacerbated the poor economic situation
(Afolayan, 1988). Nigeria has similarly not been severely affected by conflict outside of its borders, even though
recently there have been protests in Anglophone parts of Cameroon, which are located next to its Western border.
Angola, on the other hand, has been most affected. It shares a long border with the Democratic Republic of Congo
and was involved in the first and second Congo War in the 1990s (Chabal, 2002).
Another important negative factor from postcolonial history is the internal disruption caused by ethnic displace-
ment which results in refugee outflow. It is crucial here to distinguish between forced migrations and voluntary migra-
tions. Angola, for example, has had high levels of refugee outflow due to its long history of postcolonial conflict. On
the other hand, neither Nigeria nor Ghana have seen large-scale outflow of refugees in recent years, but both con-
tinue to benefit from established diasporas based on earlier voluntary migration (van Hear, 2005). Some studies have
noted that migrant returnees have a positive impact on entrepreneurial activity and that remittances and returnees
are key factors facilitating business creation back in the home country (Ammassari, 2004; Estrin et al., 2018; Linde,
2013; McCormick & Wahba, 2001; Vaaler, 2011, 2013). This is not the case where migration is forced.
The case of Ghana is instructive. The country has seen high outward migration after independence, yet greater
inward migration since the mid-1990s. Due to political and economic conditions at the time, highly skilled and pro-
fessional Ghanaians left the country between the 1960s and 1980s—indeed migration has been a significant survival
strategy for many families since Ghana's independence (Anarfi & Kwankye, 2003; Van de Walle, 2001). Furthermore,
the pattern of migration shifted away from regional destinations to more international ones in the 1980s (Afolayan,
1988). Important destinations have included the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States,
all of which have sizeable Ghanaian diaspora communities (van Hear, 2005).
This large-scale migration was largely voluntary and did not result from ethnic cleansing or conflict. This has
implications for how the emigrants relate to their home country; and has created opportunities for post-migration
backward linkages. Ghanaians formed a sizeable and highly visible diasporic community. The distinction between
diaspora and migration is significant in cultural terms; unlike a fragmented migrant community, a diasporic commu-
nity has a shared identity based on a “homeland” which may provide the social capital critical to linkages stimulating
the entrepreneurial development in the home country (Davidsson & Honig, 2003; Nanda & Sørensen, 2010). Further
migration is facilitated by diasporas: established communities abroad offer help with finding jobs, gaining skills, hav-
ing access to knowledge, and educational opportunities (Kapur, 2001; Kloosterman, Van der Leun, & Rath, 1998). All
these actions may be positively related to HGAE in the home country. The existence of a strong network though the
diaspora supports experiences conducive to building up the resources and capacity of entrepreneurs by accumulating
human and financial capital abroad, as well as by giving the ability to draw on ties within international relationships
(Estrin et al., 2018). However, these effects are weak or not present in countries that have experienced massive eth-
nic cleansing, as for example, Uganda.
2.2.4 | Summary
Our framework is based on explanations from the social science and historical literature and focuses on how geogra-
phy, colonial, and postcolonial history shaped the SSA countries. We highlight not just how each country experi-
enced a different configuration of these dimensions, but also that history suggests that these dimensions interact and
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moderate each other in unexpected ways, which makes them more than the sum of their parts. For example, the
presence of natural resources can have an ambiguous effect on EGA, as suggested by the contrasting cases of
Botswana and the Republic of South Africa (RSA; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). In RSA, the natural resources were
discovered in the 19th century, which turned out to be a curse. In Botswana, diamonds were discovered later, after
strong inclusive institutions had been established. At the same time, Botswana is a country with the lowest ethnic
heterogeneity in our sample. Thus, the role of a single factor, such as resources, is difficult to disentangle, leading us
to focus on configurations of dimensions, and this is where fuzzy sets qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) can
help. In the spirit of QCA approach, “cases are represented as configurations of conditions” (Ragin, 2014, p. xxi).
Their study through the analysis of the dimensions is the first step leading to fsQCA. While some of our dimensions
can be measured in a clear and unambiguous way (a country has either access to the sea or it is landlocked), others
must be conceptualized as continuous or “fuzzy,” for example, resource dependence or ethnic heterogeneity. We will
outline how we translate our theoretical framework into fsQCA in the next section.
3 | fsQCA ANALYSIS
As will be discussed below, we have data on EGA for 14 SSA countries; when different available years are taken into
accounts this yields 53 data points. Given the large variety of factors we have been considering, there are insufficient
degrees of freedom and too little heterogeneity for the use of country-based regression analysis. However, we can
move beyond case studies by applying fsQCA.7 This method relies on fuzzy set logic and is able to identify the con-
figurations of dimensions that are sufficient for a specific outcome to emerge (Ragin, 2008). It is not only data limita-
tions that directs us toward fsQCA. The method has the advantage over regression methods that it can handle
situations where more than one configuration is associated with a given outcome (equifinality).
In our model, the outcome is a high level of EGA and our previous discussion has identified six explanatory
dimensions related to colonial history, postcolonial history, and geography, respectively, as presented in Table 1 and
Figure 1. Each dimension is defined as membership in a set representing a given characteristic, but this membership
can be partial (fuzzy), therefore taking any value between 0 and 1. A configuration is defined as being sufficient for
an outcome if fuzzy set membership in the outcome is higher or equal to the fuzzy set membership level for each of
the dimensions that constitute this configuration (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012).
We start with the operationalization of our outcome variable: EGA, and then consider the possible explanatory
dimensions, based on the framework and factors discussed above. The fsQCA analysis will follow.
3.1 | Calibrating the outcome: EGA
We start with our outcome measure; EGA. There have been a number of recent surveys of working age population
for African countries within the framework of GEM.8 We utilize GEM's aggregate country-level data for 2001–2017
and follow the literature in using involvement in nascent high-growth aspirations start-up as our core measure of
HGAE (Autio & Acs, 2010; Estrin et al., 2013). Our measure is constructed from the GEM survey instrument, drawing
on the question where respondents are asked to declare their target level of employment 5 years hence.9 High EGA
are measured as the percentage of all early stage entrepreneurs (with new ventures that are less than 42 months
old), who declare a target of more than five employees 5 years hence.10
However, we introduce one important modification to the GEM indicator, because in its original form it is mas-
king some selection effects. The ratio of high-growth aspiration entrepreneurs to all entrepreneurs, by construction,
reflects both the denominator and nominator, and therefore does not represents the overall prevalence rate of
HGAE, which we consider a superior measure. Thus, we instead use a product of two GEM indicators:
DECKER ET AL. 11
HGAE= High−growth aspiration entrepreneurshipð Þ= workingagepopulationð Þ
= High−growth aspiration entrepreneurshipð Þ= early stage entrepreneurshipð Þ
× early stage entrepreneurshipð Þ= workingagepopulationð Þ ð1Þ
The distribution of this variable for all data points for SSA is illustrated in Figure 2 above. It produces the ranking
of countries already referred to at the beginning of Section 3.
In order to apply fsQCA, we need to transform the raw data for every independent variable into a range
between 0 (minimum) and 1 (maximum), thereby allowing membership of a set to be partial (fuzzy; Ragin, 2008). We
rank order all our variables and standardize them between zero and one utilizing the algorithm recommended by
Longest and Vaisey (2008) in the context of fsQCA. That is, we use the following formula for this transformation:
Rank of HGAE−min rankof HGAEð Þ= max rankHGAE−rankof HGAEð Þ ð2Þ
3.2 | Calibrating colonial, postcolonial history, and geography
The arguments in Section 3, summarized in Figure 1, explain our choice of six dimensions for fsQCA. Starting with
colonial heritage, for the common law versus civil code legal origin, we utilize the zero-or-one coding presented by
La Porta et al. (2008). For the ethnic heterogeneity, we took data on SSA countries from Fearon (2003) based on the
“ethnic fractionalization” (diversity) measure, “defined as the probability that two individuals selected at random from
a country will be from different ethnic groups” (ibid., p. 208). If there are n ethnic groups in the country, which shares
are denoted as p, the measure is equivalent to the following formula:
F =1−
Xn
i=1
p2i ð3Þ
This is then standardized to fit the zero–one range applying the method given by Equation (2) above.
Turning to geographic dimensions, “being land locked” is our own zero-or-one dimension derived from inspec-
tion of the map of Africa. To measure the notion of being resource rich, we use the level of natural resources rents
(the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents, mineral rents, and forest rents) as a percentage of GDP (World
Bank). Again, we transform the variable using Equation (2) above.
For recent variables from postcolonial history, we focus on two dimensions. The first is the presence of “bad
neighbors,” contemporary or in recent history, based on our own zero-or-one coding. We derive this from data on
major episodes of political violence with respect to neighboring countries from the Center for Systemic Peace. In the
second dimension, we aim to capture the effects of conflicts and oppressive governments with special emphasis on
forced displacement. This is represented by annual data on forced displacement originating from the International
Conflict Research database compiled and made available by the Department of Humanities, Social and Political Sci-
ences of ETH Zürich. We take their figures on the annual numbers of refugees originated from a country scaled by
total population (the latter taken from the World Bank database) to produce annual numbers going back to 1975.
However, this is recent history and we wish to capture the aggregate impact of these annual flows for the points of
time we have in our data. For this, we utilize the idea of applying depreciation rates to history, as developed by Per-
sson and Tabellini (2009). Accordingly, to obtain a scalar representing a proxy for the overall current impact of refu-
gees escaping from a given country at a given point of time, we assume that the impact of each particular year of the
past depreciates with each year at a standard depreciation rate of 0.03 (so the annual discount factor becomes 0.97,
as used by Persson & Tabellini, 2009). This method leads us to apply the following formula, where ref/popt corre-
sponds to the ratio of refugees from a country to its population in year t; next t0 corresponds to 1975; and finally
T corresponds to 2016:
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X
τ = T
τ = t0
ref
pop
0:97T−τ ð4Þ
For fsQCA, this was again standardized to fit the zero–one range, using Equation (2).
The data for all these dimensions are reported in the Appendix in their final form as Supporting Information -
Table A1, with an intention for make our results verifiable and replicable. We also report the averages for each coun-
try in Table 2.
Supporting Information Table A1, with rows representing cases and columns representing explanatory dimen-
sions and the outcome, becomes what, following the set-theoretic terminology, is called the truth table (Ragin, 2008;
Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). It is utilized in this form in fsQCA, to which we turn next.
3.3 | Results of the fsQCA tests
We perform fsQCA on the truth table, applying the Fuzzy module for Stata designed by Longest and Vaisey (2008).
The module utilizes fuzzy sets logic (Ragin, 2008) to identify the alternative configurations of dimensions (solutions)
consistent with the outcome (in our case defined by the population prevalence rates of high growth entrepreneurial
aspirations). It next simplifies the solutions, combining raw solutions where possible. This is achieved by eliminating
the dimensions that are spurious: when a dimension appears both in its positive and in its negative form, then the
two solutions can be combined into a simpler one, eliminating the dimension for which all of its range is allowed.
Importantly, unlike standard regression techniques that are based on correlations and assume symmetry (posi-
tive outcomes need to be associated with positive, and negative with negative), fsQCA does not have the symmetry
restriction. Instead, fsQCA is consistent with requirements of set-theory and formal logic. The solutions therefore
TABLE 2 Abbreviated truth table (country means): Dimensions for fsQCA
Country
Resource
rents Landlocked
Bad
neighbors
Ethnic
heterogeneity
Common
law
Refugees from
(time-
discounted)
Entrepreneurial
aspirations
Angola 0.96 0 1 0.26 0 0.96 0.73
Botswana 0.04 1 1 0.00 1 0.00 0.93
Burkina
Faso
0.83 1 0 0.07 0 0.00 0.66
Cameroon 0.36 0 1 0.89 0 0.00 0.63
Ethiopia 0.71 1 1 0.33 0 0.87 0.31
Ghana 0.67 0 0 0.47 1 0.65 0.64
Madagascar 0.50 0 0 0.52 0 0.00 0.00
Malawi 0.47 1 0 0.42 1 0.18 0.03
Namibia 0.02 0 1 0.12 1 0.89 0.50
Nigeria 0.72 0 0 0.37 1 0.23 0.93
Senegal 0.13 0 1 0.20 0 0.69 0.90
South Africa 0.28 0 1 0.69 1 0.44 0.23
Uganda 0.64 1 1 1.00 1 0.78 0.51
Zambia 0.81 1 1 0.16 1 0.00 0.47
Note: For definitions and sources, please see Section 3.2. Where appropriate, figures in the table rounded to two digit
decimal points for the sake of presentation.
Abbreviation: fsQCA, fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis.
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should be interpreted as sufficient conditions for the outcome, and there may be many of them. Thus there may be
several paths (configurations) associated with a given outcome; this characteristic is termed equifinality (Ragin, 2008,
2014). Moreover, lack of symmetry also implies that the configurations of dimensions associated with the negative
outcome (in our case: low levels of EGA) need not to be the mirror image of the configurations of dimensions for the
positive outcome (high levels of EGA). It is therefore recommended to perform two separate fsQCA exercises, for
the positive and the negative outcomes, respectively (Ragin, 2008), and this is what we do. The results of the first of
these are presented in Table 3 below, in a form that became conventional in the literature, see for example,
Greckhamer (2016).11 A black circle implies that a dimension is present in a sufficient condition for the outcome (high
growth entrepreneurial aspirations), while a white circle implies that an absence of a dimension is present in a suffi-
cient condition for the outcome.
The configurations (solution sets) that we present in the rows of Table 3 are conservative. It is common in fsQCA
to simplify the solutions further by utilizing additional assumptions related to the counterfactual and possible outcomes
of combinations not presented in the data (see Ragin, 2008). Yet, these simplification methods are often questionable
(Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). Moreover, we did not feel we had strong enough priors for such an analysis. Hence
our solutions are based solely on the information in the data, and as the result they are more complex.
The solutions can be presented in a single expression which facilitates interpretation. Let us adopt the following
notation: Res for resource dependency, Lnd for being landlocked, Bri for the former British colonies (common law),
Eth for high degree of ethnic heterogeneity, Nei for bad neighbors, Ref for the refugees escaping the country. In that
case, the solutions presented in Table 3 can be expressed the following way, adopting conventional notation as in
Schneider and Wagemann (2012), where ~ relates to negation:
Bri* Lnd* Nei +Res*Ethð Þ+ Lnd*
Ref* Res*Nei + Res*Bri + Eth*Brið Þ+Nei* Eth* Lnd*Res+ Res* Lndð Þ!HGAE ð5Þ
Our interpretation of this expression is the following. The first term stresses two dimensions that we expected
to be associated with higher level of EGA: being a former British colony (common law tradition) and having access to
TABLE 3 Results of fsQCA: Explaining high-growth aspiration entrepreneurship
Solution
Dimension S1 S2 S3 S4 S5
Resource-dependent ● ●  
Landlocked   ●  
Common law ● ●
Ethnic heterogeneity  
Bad neighbors ● ●  ●
Refugees from 
Best fit Angola Ghana Botswana Nigeria Cameroon
Consistency 0.881 0.887 0.959 0.785 0.912
Raw coverage 0.265 0.244 0.218 0.178 0.112
Overall consistency 0.766
Overall coverage 0.858
Note: Coverage measures how much of the outcome is covered by each of the solutions, and overall by all the solutions.
With X corresponding to explanatory dimensions and Y corresponding to the outcome, the formula for coverage is:
Coverage (Xi ≤ Yi) = Σ[min(Xi,Yi)/Σ(Yi)], as proposed by Ragin (2008).
Abbreviation: fsQCA, fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis.
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sea. This term describes both Ghana and Nigeria. However, as often happens with fsQCA, the terms in parenthesis
offer two alternative interpretations open to us. Either we interpret high EGA in Ghana and Nigeria as a result of
combining British colonial heritage and sea access with not having bad neighbors (Solution S4 in Table 3), or with
being resource rich but with relatively low negative impact of ethnic fractionalization (Solution S2 in Table 3). Obvi-
ously, a less negative impact of ethnic fractionalization and not having bad neighbors are both likely to play a positive
role but based on our analysis in Section 2, we are inclined to attribute the first case primarily to Ghana, and the sec-
ond primarily to Nigeria.
The second term represents countries that are landlocked, but critically for HGAE to emerge, this must be com-
pensated by a low level of internal conflict. Thus, nowhere else in the whole expression do we see being landlocked
without a low level of conflict next to it (as proxied by a low number of refugees escaping from the country). Next,
within parentheses we see additional dimensions that represent different configurations in the data that accompany
being landlocked and having low level of conflict. Botswana is the clearest case here, and it corresponds to the first
configuration within the parenthesis: it has bad neighbors and its economy is not dominated by resources despite
the diamond mining. Yet this is compensated by internal stability, the key factor for HGAE in this configuration. In
Table 3, this is the Solution S3. The two other solutions in this group have coverage of less than 0.05 and we omit
them from the summary in Table 3.
The final term illustrates how the negative impact of having bad neighbors can be compensated. In parentheses
we have two possible combinations (Solutions S1 and S5 in Table 3), and for the first of these, Angola is the best fit.
In this case, we have a resource-dependent economy, but this is compensated by both access to the sea and by rela-
tively low levels of ethnic heterogeneity. For the second configuration, bad neighbors are compensated by access to
the sea and low dependency on natural resources (best fit: Cameroon).
We now turn to configurations associated with low entrepreneurial aspirations. Again, we can summarize the
solution set in one expression, as below:
Bri* Nei* Lnd+ Lnd*Neið Þ+ Bri*Nei*Ref* Res +  Lndð Þ ð6Þ
The first term relates to former British (common law) colonies. Taken alone, we would expect this dimension to
correspond to a higher level of EGA. However, looking inside the parentheses, we see this being either
counterbalanced by bad neighbors (Solution S1, with the best fit here being RSA) or by being landlocked (Solution
S2, with best fit here being Malawi). Thus, for Malawi, it seems that this is a scenario of the curse of geography. With
RSA, it seems that a recent disruption in neighboring countries, in particular in Zimbabwe, could have had a serious
impact.
The second term represents former continental Europe colonies. It seems that other dimensions that we would
associate with higher growth aspirations cannot compensate for the impact of this heritage on entrepreneurial dyna-
mism. At the same time, the empirical relevance of this term (corresponding to Solutions S3 and S4) is low; the cover-
age figure is below 0.05 in each case; we do not report these solutions in Table 4 below.
4 | DISCUSSION
We do not have cases where a country would score highly on all the dimensions we would consider relevant for high
EGA. Rather, the patterns that the fsQCA has identified suggest that “good” outcomes are associated with configura-
tions where some negative aspects are more than compensated by positive ones. For example, for Angola, the
fsQCA suggests that the positive impact of coastal location and relatively low ethnic heterogeneity counterbalance
the negative effect of resource rents. This logic is consistent with the literature as discussed in Section 3.
The second interesting outcome we would like to highlight is Botswana: solution S3 highlights the importance of
low levels of internal conflict (as proxied by not having refugees escaping from the country), which compensates for
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unfavorable location. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) argue that the origins of this may go back to indigenous local
institutions that stressed resolving conflict by deliberation and debate instead of violence. This may be a deeper
dimension that we did not capture in our data.
Based on the pattern seen in Figure 2, overall, resource-driven economies show higher rates of EGA which sug-
gests, at least in the SSA context, that more and better economic opportunities can sometimes result either despite
or even because of having resource extractive industries. Importantly, as argued by Wenar (2016) and Acemoglu and
Robinson (2012), resources in SSA may become a blessing instead of a curse. This conclusion is conditional on the
extent of consensus, the absence of a disruptive conflict, and the quality of formal and informal institutions at the
time when the exploitation of the resource commences. In turn, the quality of institutions is affected by either the
character of colonial governance or by the local indigenous institutions; again, Botswana is a good example here.
The presence of all the factors identified by fsQCA shows that, in addition to long-term historical factors (colo-
nial history) and geography, medium to short-term postcolonial history also has an impact on EGA. In that sense,
HGAE in Africa is not only rooted in the distant past; its prevalence is also affected by the specific recent factors in
national postcolonial histories. This also includes the impact of neighboring countries. The dimension that appeared
in most of the solution sets for both “good” and “bad” EGA outcomes is the presence or absence of bad neighbors. In
that sense, geography matters again: for African entrepreneurs it is not only relevant what happens in their own
countries; the opportunities they face are also strongly influenced by their neighbors. To see how important this may
be, it is sufficient to make a comparison, for example, with the European Union, where the probability of having dis-
ruptive neighbors has become so low that it is no longer relevant either for economic development or for HGAE.
Similarly, being land locked is an important factor in most of the configurations: access to the sea dominates in solu-
tions for “good” outcomes (see Table 3). Again, this is unlikely to be as significant in other contexts where transport
infrastructure is more developed.
In a way, what we did not find is as interesting as what we did find. One general result we would like to highlight
is that we could not identify solutions based on strong presence of single dimensions; it is always the configurations
that matter. This is consistent with both the analytical assumptions of multicausal explanations in history and set-
analytic approaches. Again, this can be illustrated in particular by the impact of high natural resource rents, a theme
that features strongly in the social science and economics literature. For HGAE, the impact of natural resources is
ambiguous: there are several SSA economies where resources rents do not discourage entrepreneurial activity and
TABLE 4 Results of fsQCA: Explaining
low-growth aspiration entrepreneurship
Solution
Dimension S1 S2
Resource-dependent
Landlocked  ●
Common law ● ●
Ethnic heterogeneity
Bad neighbors ● 
Refugees from
Best fit RSA Malawi
Consistency 0.751 0.971
Raw coverage 0.482 0.073
Overall consistency 0.786
Overall coverage 0.639
Note: Please see note to Table 3.
Abbreviations: fsQCA, fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis; RSA,
Republic of South Africa.
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Angola is the most remarkable example of that. Rather, EGA are always codependent on other aspects of geography,
coastal location, and both long and short/medium term histories, where the latter are not entirely dependent on
colonial legacies.
Historical analysis in conjunction with fsQCA therefore provides significant theoretical insights into how institu-
tional environments affect entrepreneurship (Baumol, 1990; Baumol & Strom, 2007), and specifically high-growth
aspirations (Autio & Acs, 2010; Estrin et al., 2013). We highlight the role of context-bound factors such as bad neigh-
bors and coastal location as important determinants of HGAE, which would not have been discernible from research
in more commonly investigated regions such as North America or Western Europe (Tsui, 2004). Here, high quality of
governance in neighboring states and good transport infrastructure make these variables irrelevant to analysis, and
thus render them invisible for theorization. Our analysis further contributes to entrepreneurial theory by investigat-
ing common factors emphasized in the development literature as detrimental to economic and entrepreneurial activi-
ties, such as resource dependence and ethnic heterogeneity. Importantly, we find that they do not have a uniformly
negative effect on EGA. Rather their effect depends on other factors such as coastal location, and can even be bene-
ficial. We also challenge the idea that legal origins determine long-term economic development. FsQCA demon-
strates that specific configurations offset the effect of legal origins, and that other dimensions are more important
determinants of EGA: in three out of five solution sets for positive outcomes, legal origins do not feature.
Overall, our results underline the importance of theorizing the influence of institutional environments on entre-
preneurship as configurations of multiple dimensions. On the one hand, the analytically structured histories empha-
sized multicausal explanations for institutional developments in our three focal countries (Angola, Ghana, and
Nigeria) and helped us interpret the results of the fsQCA. Set-theoretic approaches, on the other hand, provide
unambiguous solutions that identify which dimensions matter in what configuration. Our approach contributes to
institutional and entrepreneurship theory (Baumol, 1990; North, 1990) and represents a methodological contribution
through its innovative combination of historical narrative and fsQCA. Theoretically, we emphasize the importance of
configurations in understanding the influence of institutional environments on HGAE. We identified several relevant
dimensions that occur in configurations that impact entrepreneurial activity, but we believe that further research will
specify additional dimensions.
5 | CONCLUSION
We focus on the role of history, both long term and more recent, as well as geography in enabling or inhibiting
HGAE. Our first objective is to understand which configurations of historical and geographic dimensions affect EGA
in present-day SSA. We therefore begin with a synthesis of the extant social science and historical literatures, which
we present as analytically structured histories of three focal countries: Angola, Ghana, and Nigeria. On the basis of
the historical analysis, we develop a theoretical framework that highlights the role of colonial and postcolonial his-
tory and geography in determining the institutional environment of entrepreneurship. We go on to apply fsQCA to
identify the configurations of historical and geographic factors supportive of HGAE, and detrimental to it. We con-
firm that, firstly, it is configurations that explain entrepreneurial outcomes, not individual variables. Also, some vari-
ables highlighted in different literatures are not uniformly associated with positive or negative outcomes (resource
dependence, ethnic heterogeneity, legal origins) as previously claimed. Finally, our context-bound theorizing contrib-
utes new analytic dimensions to entrepreneurial theory that research in more commonly studied context would not
have revealed (bad neighbors, landlocked).
Our research makes several contributions to the entrepreneurship literature. First, despite increased awareness
of the institutional determinants of entrepreneurship (Baumol, 1990; De Clercq, Lim, & Oh, 2013), the role of histori-
cal dimensions in shaping EGA has not previously been explored. Moreover, while research on African entrepreneur-
ship is growing (Acs et al., 2013; Daspit & Long, 2014; Khayesi, George, & Antonakis, 2014; Kuada, 2015; Nyantakyi,
2016; Rooks, Klyver, & Sserwanga, 2014; Scott, Dolan, Johnstone-Louis, Sugden, & Wu, 2012), no one has as yet
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considered the role of historical factors and how they combine with geographic ones to explain EGA on that conti-
nent. Our approach builds on the premise that an analytically structured history (Rowlinson et al., 2014) can enhance
explanations of the difference in EGA between countries. By integrating analytically structured histories within
entrepreneurship studies, we build on previous research about the historical origins of economic development in
Africa (Austin, 2008; Hough & Grier, 2015; Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2018; Woolcock, Szreter, & Rao, 2011)
and follow the call for a greater awareness of history in business studies by Wadhwani (2016a, 2016b), Lippmann
and Aldrich (2014, 2016), and the recent special issue on historical entrepreneurship in this journal (Gartner et al.,
forthcoming). The latter highlight the relative scarcity of work that explore the relationship between broad processes
of socioeconomic change and entrepreneurship, one of the areas to which the journal seeks to contribute.
We are also the first entrepreneurship researchers to address this question by integrating fsQCA with historical
analysis. As recommended by Ragin, we therefore aim “to make sense out of different cases by piecing evidence
together in a manner sensitive to chronology and by offering limited historical generalizations that are both
objectively possible and cognizant of enabling conditions and limiting means—of context.” (Ragin, 2014, p. 3) This
methodology, in conjunction with historical case studies, produces a rich set of insights on the deeply rooted,
context-related factors of entrepreneurial aspirations. Clearly, our work is only a preliminary step in this direction,
and opportunities for both more nuanced analysis and for application to other emerging market regions abound. This
more nuanced analysis naturally leads to historical research, which has the potential significantly to enrich entrepre-
neurial theorizing.
Our analysis raises new questions for the entrepreneurship literature, leading us to call for a shift toward an
appreciation of the impact of complex configurations on entrepreneurial activity. Thus, in contrast to traditional
regression-based analysis, our approach implies mapping the alternative historical and geographic configurations that
can lead to high-aspiration entrepreneurship. In the context of SSA, we posit that the relevant dimensions that form
these configurations should draw upon elements of geography, colonial, and postcolonial histories.
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ENDNOTES
1 A number of special issues have addressed the relative absence of studies on emerging economies (Bruton, Ahlstrom, &
Obloj, 2008; Bruton, Filatotchev, Si, & Wright, 2013; Smallbone, Welter, & Ateljevic, 2014; Tracey & Phillips, 2011).
2 http://blogs.worldbank.org/africacan/7-facts-about-population-in-sub-saharan-africa, accessed on November 26, 2018.
3 In 2008, resource income was 57% of GDP in Angola. However, since then, the share continued to decrease rapidly over
the past decade to stabilize at the level which is no longer that much higher compared to the two other countries (16%
for Angola, compared to 13% for Ghana, and 9% for Nigeria; all in 2017; World Bank data).
4 See https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018 (accessed November 2, 2019).
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5 On wider discussion of clientelism and patronage systems, see: Fukuyama (2014).
6 The partitioning of a single ethnic area into Ghana and Togo offers a natural experiment on the impact of different colo-
nial systems. After the First World War, the western part (Ghana) became a British and the eastern part (Togo) a French
colony. It has been documented that the level of educational attainment is higher on the Ghana side of the border
(Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2018).
7 We are greatly indebted to the anonymous referee for suggesting this as a methodological strategy.
8 The GEM database is widely recognized as the best source of comparative entrepreneurship data (Davidsson, 2016). Its
methodology is described by Reynolds et al. (2005). SSA countries that participated are: Republic of South Africa (RSA),
Uganda, Angola, Ghana, Zambia, Nigeria, Botswana, Ethiopia, Malawi, Namibia, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Senegal, and
Madagascar.
9 The exact question is the following: “How many people will be working for this business, not counting the owners but
including all exclusive subcontractors, when it is five years old? By exclusive subcontractors, we mean only people or
firms working ONLY for this business, and not working for others as well.” (Global Entrepreneurship Monitor Adult Popula-
tion Survey, various years).
10 The underlying entrepreneurial growth aspiration data are continuous, but suffer from serious non-normal distribution
and beyond some threshold, the pattern of high-level answers clearly demonstrates problems. Thus, to apply a cut-off
point is justified on empirical grounds.
11 Following Schneider and Wagemann (2012), we take 0.75 as a conventional threshold point of low versus high consis-
tency. We therefore ignore solutions characterized by consistency below that point.
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